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ROLES FOR AIr,SHIPS
.... IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
George J. Bei_r*
:_ Gerardo Cahn Hidalgo**
i ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to demonstrate that airships
of known and tested technology could, in some cases, per-
form routine transport missions more economically than con-
ventional transport modes. If infrastructure for direct
surface transport is already in place or if such infra- '_
structure can be justified by the size of the market and
there are no unusual impediments to constructing it, then
the airships of tested technology cannot normally compete.
If, however, the surface routes would be unusually expen-
sive or circuitous, cr if thcy involve several transhlp-
ments, or if the market size is too small to spread infra-
structure costs of conventional transport, the airships of
tested technology present a workable alternative. The paper
'_ argues from a series o_ special cases. The cases, though
unusual, are noc unique; there are several similar possible
applications which, fn total, would provide a reasonably
large market for airships.
%
INTRODUCTION
The World Bank has a substantial interest in transport development.
Through fiscal year 1973 the Bank had lent over $6,788 million for
various transport projects. Although roads and railroads acceunt for !
the bulk of this total the Bank also lends for pipelines, ports, and
aviation. Our transportation loans have financed investment in vir- i
tually all the developing _ountrle_ of Africa, Asia and Latin America. i
The Bank, through its country oriented economic work, transpert sector
studies and project appraisal, including the 8nalyses of possible
alternative investments, attempts to expand the context of countries' ,_
plans for transport development. Within the general requirement that
a project must have an acceptable payoff in development, the Bank has i
really unlimited freedom to finance a project using any technique, i
* Economist, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A. i_
** Engineer, _conomlst. _
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%" The "final product" of the Bank is simply a loan to a developing
_ country to make an investmeut. Virtually all of our operations are
aimed at helping the country to choose wisely among the alternatives
available and to complement the investments with sound development
policies. Thus our prim_r_ interest it, studying airships is to decide
__+ whether this form of transport should be recommended to a country for
study as a realistic and viable alternative.i
The ideas that we present in the rest of this poper are aimed at stim-
+ i ulating discussion among airship experts of possible applications of :_
_ airships, in special cases, to solve the immediate transport problems '
I! of less developed countries. We attempt to demonstrate that, using . !
+' i existing technology, the airship apparently has a series of possible
d.¢elopment missions. _
; }
,' In the section that follows we will present extended examples of
° possible uses of airships of more or less well-known and tested tech-
nologies. In each case we attempt to show that there is a prima facie
_,_o.++ case for applying known technology to a new task. •
+_ CASE STUDIES +:
Two cases of completely different nature will be analyzed, the appli-L
.. cation of large airships of over I00 ton load capacity for long dis-
tance transportation; the utilization of small airships to haul small <
cargoes for short distances. ._
_ Cost Characteristics of the Airships +
In order to proceed with a cost comparison of the airships against the
':_ conventional modes of transport several assumptions are necessary. For
the most Dart these are implied in Table I or are specifically identi- \
: fled in the footnotes, but a few crucial assumptions should be dis-
_ cussed before turning to the Table.
_' (a) Cost of Construction: We have no recent direct evidence on :
capital cost for a large airship. Research and development, however,
are very minor cost elements; we are simply attempting to estimate :
how much the cost of construction has increased over the years. The
basic design and operating characteristics are well-known. Dr. Eckener, _
in 1952, estimated the cost of a new Hindenburg at $7.7 to $].2.5
million, i.e. from $68 to $II0 per kg empty weight. We have assumed a
present construction cost of $200 per kg empty weight for the large
airship--about three times Dr. Eckenec's low estimate. This seems _i
about an adequate allowance for increased cost since 1952. For the
smaller airships (2 tons and 15 tons), we assumed a construction cost
of $300 per kg empty weight, in accordance with the average co_t esti-
mates given by manufacturers for airships in this size range. Since
they are intended for use in more difficult terrain, with many take-
off operations, these airships will have to be more maneuverable and
have a higher power weight ratio than the larger ship.
(b) Interest and depreciation: Throughout the paper we assume a i0%
interest rate for all alternative transport investments. We assume a
20 year llfe for the large airship and a I0 year life for the smaller
airships, in recognition of the rougher job envisioned for the small
ship. A 20 year life may be near the outer limit of reasonable
assumptions for the large ship but it is not clear that successful
airships in this class, e.g., the Graf Zeppelin, were anywhere near
[
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the end of their useful life when they were scrapped for want of helium.
(c) Flight time: We assume that the large airship could fly 6,000hours a year. By way of comparison, the Hindenburg flew 2,810 hours
in its first nine months of service, an annual rate of 4,215 hours.
.... The use we are considering is a regular, shuttle type operation and _i
the 6,000 hours assumption should not be too optimistic in these cir-
cumstances. For the smaller airship, in rougher terrain with irregular
loadings, we assume a 3,000 hour per year performance--rough!y, a day- i_
time only schedule. ._
(d) The large airship would operate at nearly ideal altitudes and tem-
peratures in the main use considered. The smaller airships would oper-
ate out of a set of bases about 700 meters above sea level, conducting
most of their operations over territory of about that altitude.
:._ The large airship is patterned on the Hindenburg, one of the largest
airships ever in operation. It was a rigid dirigible with a gas volume
_'_ of 216,000 cubic meters, a static gross lift of 206,400 kg, empty
weight of 113,000 kg and useful lift of 93,000 kg. S.L.T.A. Inc. has
made a series of estimates on the characteristics of a modernized
Hindenburg (which we shall call the "H2"). The H2 is similar in design
to the Hindenburg, incorporates no radical technological change, but is
. increased linearly _n dimensions by 10_. This increases the volume of
the H2 to 266,000 mJ, and the gross lift to 266,000 kg. Incorporating
• modern structural materials, lighter engines, and modern advances in
; gearing, the H2 should be able to achieve a slightly better static
efficiency; we have assumed a useful .ift equal to empty weight,
_ 133,000 kg, using helium as the lifting gas. :
On these assumptions, the cost estimates of Table i were prepared, i
k i
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TABLE I
"' COST CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS AIRSHIPS
133 ton 15 ton 2 ton
._ airship airship airship i
i, Airspeed (km hr) 129 130 130 '
: Ground Speed (km hr) 113 If0 II0
_o Stage length studied (km)i/ 1,290 220 220
Flight duration (hours) 11.4 2 2
i Horsepower required 4,937 1,700 1,000
Fuel required Z/(kg per trip) 11,256 680 400 ,
Payload (metric tons) 121.7 II.25 &/ 1.50 £/
.-'" Productivity in ton km per hour 13,752 1,238 165
Personnel and Maintenance cost ($/hr) 150 83 43 '
Personnel and Maintenance cost (C/ton km) 1 09 6 7 26.1e /[, • •Fuel cost (C/ton kin) 84_/ Z /e/ 12.
Direct operating cost (C/ton km) _.93 9 38.2
. Yearly capital recovery charge ($million) #.12f/ I_8K/ _31=h/
Yearly payload (million ton km) 82.51 3.71 .50
2 Capital charge (C/ton km) 3.78 18.3 62.0
Total Cost (C/ton km) 5.71 27.7 100.2
a/ Average stage length of the main comparison study included below.
_/ 0.2 kg per hp per hour.
_; _/ Assumed 75% load factor.
' _/ Price per kg, April 1974 price FOB Matadi.
_. _/ Price per kg $0.I0.
_ _/ Cost $26.6 million, depreciated over 20 years at i0% interest.
K/ Cost $4.20 million, depreciated over I0 years at 10% interest,
E/ Cost $1.89 million, depreciated over I0 years at I0% interest.
Source: Based on data furnished by Studiengruppe Luftshiffbau und
Anwendungs Bereiche.
Use of the H2 in the Zaire export/import trade
The cost calculation for the H2, shown in Table i, was derived to
approximate the cost per ton km of the shuttle service of copper from
the Katanga to an Atlantic port, Lobito, and the return of general
cargo to Katanga, a stage length of about 1,290 km. Adequate balanced
bulk cargo traffic is generated on this route to insure a virtually
_ continuous full load operation. Hence the I00_ load factor implied in
the Table 1 calculations. The operating conditions on this route are
nearly ideal: moderate temperatures and low land elevation.
To compare the cost of the H2 against conventional modes of transport,
we calculated the cost per ton via airship over the 1,290 km stage
length from Katanga to Lobito: $73.6 per ton (5.71¢ per ton km times
i,290 kin).
4&8
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The first set of costs against which to evaluats the performance of the
H2 are the short run costs of conventional transport modes: the direct _
operating cost of vehicles (railroad rolling stock and river fleets);
the costs of administration repair and maintenance of infrastructure _'_
that vary with use of the infrastructure; the depreciation and inter- I_'
est cost of the vehicle fleet.
Specifically excluded ar a y construction or capital charges for in-
frastructure, or any charge for fixed administration or maintenance. 7
The present transport route we are considering is composed of three _ .
parts: the Kinshasa-Dilolo-Lubumbashi Railroad (KDL), from the copper
areas of the Katanga to Port Francqui (1,430 km); a river barge
portion from Pert Francqui to the Port of Kinshasa (800 km); and a
further railroad, the Chemin de fer de Matadi Kinshasa (CFMK), 366 km
from Kinshasa to Matadl, the port on the Congo river with access to
the Atlantic.
ZAIRE COPPER TRAFFIC - Conventionalversus Airship Route
@  ASAI
=_ _FR_UI
BANANA
b;
KATANOA
COPPER
AREA
!
_ ATLANTIC } _ / .... I _"
i
_ The cost characteristics of the present modes were studied in a major
work published in 1971 by the French consulting firm BCEOM. Without
updating for the inflation since then, except to take account of the
'_ increase in fuel prices, we obtain the following cost estimates: i
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TABLE II :
.... OPERATING COSTS OF MATADI-KATA__GA TRIP-CONVENTIONAL MODES i
i
'-" US¢Itonkm KM S/ton i
Katanga-Port Francqul (rail) 2.86 _/ 1,430 40.89 J
_ Port Francqui Trans-shipment 5.95 '
J Port Francqui-Kinshasa (river) 0.92 800 7.36
, " I Kinshasa Trans-shipment 5.95
_ I Kinshasa-Matadi (rail) 1.75 _/ 366 6.40
: Total Operating Costs 66.33 i ,
-- I
:_ Inventory Cost of Goods in Transit _/ 5.04
""_' Total transit cost exclusive of infra- i
;. ¢
7 structure investments costs (per ton/trip) 71.59
_ Source: BCEOM, Etude de Transport de la Vole National, October 1971.
_ _ a/ To update the fuel price changes, the fuel component in marginal
cost for the two railways was multiplied by a factor of 3.715, the
:' latter being the ratio of gas oil prices in 1974 ($117 per metric
ton CIF Matadi) and 1971 (estimated at $31.50 per metric ton ClF
West African ports).
h/ An interest rate of I0_, a _opper price (FOB Matadi) of $1,624 per
i ton, and a bulk goods price (backhaul cargo) of $200 per ton, were
•'. used to calculate the inventory cost for 20.2 days (the average
trip time from Katanga to the port).
A comparison of the two modes shows that there is a very slight
difference between the costs (less infrastructure costs) of conven-
tional modes of transport ($71.6 per ton) and the total costs (in-
cluding construction costs) of the H2 ($73.6 per ton). Turning the
analysis on its head, we calculate that the H2 would Just break even
against conventional modes for the trip from the copper fields to an
Atlantic Port if the H2 could be built for about $25.5 million instead
of the $26.6 million which we assumed.
The inclusion of a reasonable allowance for infrastructure investment
would make the airship's cost advantage very striking. Relying again
on BCEOM data, the cost per ton for the trip Katanga-Matadi, on a full
cost basis, would be about $20-25 per ton higher than shown in the
comparison. In other words, on a total cost basis for both modes, the
airship is about 25_ cheaper ($73 per ton vs $95 p?r ton).
The full cost comparison is not very precise; the BCEOM estimate
refers to full cost of past investment rather than the full cost of
future investment which might be avoided by use of airships, but it is
not unreasonable to assume that the BCEOM estimate is less than full
future cost. The llst of conventional investments required to handle
increments to traffic is indeed impressive, totalling from $148 m_llion
to $266 million, at 1971 prices, for the period to 1990 depending on
the assumption concerning use of foreign routes. The bulk ef this
investm_gt might be avoided or postponed for many years by use of air-
ships. _/
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A few other features of the comparison of costs between conventional
modes and the H2 seem worthy of special note. The competitiveness of
the airship against conventional modes without infrastructure cost
depends on the much longer surface route. This suggests that at the
present state of the arts the airship will not be generally compet-
itive for bulk loads in cases where surface infrastructure is adequate
and the trip is fairly direct, but that the flexibility of routes may ..
tip the scales in favor of the airship when the surface route is in- _
direct. Second, higher fuel prices make airships more competitive
rather than less so. Fuel costs are only about 15% of total airship .i
cost; the bulk of the cost is the capital charge. At 1974 prices "
fuel is in the neighborhood of 35% of operating costs for the com- '-.
pet!rive modes. Our comparison will hence be more favorable as oil ..
prices increase, less favorable for a decline in oil prices. Third, ,<
inventory costs,even for a commodity as expensive as copper, do not ,
turn out to be very important relative to other transport cost items.
We have made this comparison only to the Atlantic ports because we
have no basis for a comparison of port costs for the H2 and conven- _o
tional modes. No airship has ever undertaken this type of commercial
freight operation. But it is generally believed that port costs could
be lower for the H2. Using the airships ability to operate from a
sheltered water base, the H2 might lighter onto a special purpose
, barge, and pick up return cargo, without ever using the normal port
, facilities. It seems quite clear that this will always give the air-
ship a decided advantage over other air transport because conventional
airplanes with a landing site away from the port require at i_ast one
more transhlpment and a short surface haul. In normal circumstances,
transhipment to ships from the H2 would pzobably be cheaper than
transhlpment from rail. i
Use of H2 for Exports of Horticulture Products from Kenya
An often mentioned possible mission for airships is the intercontin- ! !
ental shipment of fresh produce. For our example, we investigated the
possibility of increasing the vegetable and fruit shipments from East
Central Africa to Europe--speciflcally the shipment of such _oods from
Nalrobl to London. At Nairobi to London backhaul rates ranging from i$.48 per kg (IATA rate) to $.35 per kg (the most favorable contract
rate) the transportation of produce by air has increaled from Just i
over one thousand metric tons in 1969 to 6.5 thousand metric tons in i i
the first nine months of 1972. The 1972 traffic expe'lenced shortages i
' of cargo space at backhaul rates, and the growth of this traffic is :,
expected if transport at these rates can be expanded. Sufficient
volumes already exist to employ an H2, and traffic ca_ be expected to
i expand.
The cost per ton km at backhaul rates (for comparison to Table I)
ranges from 7.08¢ (IATA rates) to 5.16¢ (contract rat_s). As Table I -_
shows, the cost per ton kal for the H2 in virtually id_lal conditions is _
5.71¢. Increasing costs by about one-half to compens_Jte for less "_
favorable operating conditions the H2 could still del_ver at rates in
the general neighborhood of the 1973 IATA bac!d_aul rates.
_t
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The H2 presents a transport alternative, not very much more costly
t than the backhaul rates which have fostered rapid expansion of the
' Kenya-London vegetable and fruit trade, and well below the costs of
: transport at orindary rates, which at the beginning of 1973 were about
18¢ per ton km from the Nairobi Region to Europe. It would appear ;
,-. , therefore that the H2, or eventually a more advanced airship, may be
"_. important in breaking the backhaul bottleneck that now impedes further
horticulture development in Kenya._/
!
. However, the H2 faces special problems not encountered by backhaul
_/ / traffic. First, the bulking requirements (I00 tons) would be much
:: _ I more demanding at the point of origin. Second, the low speed wouldI
_ make the H2 less flexible in meeting the timing requirement at markets .
< than is backhaul traffic. Finally, the airship is barely competitive ,
with conventional airplanes on a cost basis for handling the traffic ..
once volumes are large enough (say 15,000 tons per year) to Justify a
• . cargo plane devoted to this use. Costs, calculated on the same basis
• as those for the H2 ranged from 3.5¢ to 5.5¢ per ton km for conven-
_"'-" tional aircraft in 1972. For comparable planes the cost increase has
been about 60% since that time, mainly on account of fuel cost in-
.. creases which have more than doubled. Costs for conventional aircraft
would thus be in the 6 to 8 cent range, per ton km, at this point in
1974, roughly competitive with the H2. Ground cost advantages of the
i , H2 would probably be minimal in this situation where the infrastructure
for planes is already highly developed.3/ 4/
,I
The H2 as an Alternative to Infrastructure Development, a Burundi Case
_i_ Another possible use of the H2 is to fill the (often discussed) trans-
_. port vacuum in the case where a clearly important potential traffic
L faces a lack of some of the required infrastructure components for
/ conventional transport The economic choice is between the three
,:, options: not developing the resource; infrastructure development for
surface or cargo plane transport; and shipment by airship. The par-
titular case we shall summarize is the movement of nickel deposits
,_ from an area in Burundi to the seaport of Dares Salaam.
4
A large and rich nickel deposit lies very shallow (susceptible to open
gap mining), near Rutava in Central Burundi. The potential output of
the mine is not precisely known, but 30,000 tons per year of metal
(perhaps 45-50,000 tons of concentrates if it is shipped in that form)
is the expected output of the mines once they are established.
\ BuJu_buro
"!___oe%/,ppro.rimate location of depositDirect Air Route to Mombasa Port, 1072 k_
. _ v.,,st ,fri_ _ilw,,v _".'-.2._ Tabors
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The conventional transport alternatives can be briefly summarized: _I
J
(a) A road can be built (or existing roads upgraded) between the J
Rutava re_ion and BuJumbura, a distance of about 160 km. From Bujum- |
burs (a lake port on Lake Tanganyika) the metal or concentrate could
go by barge to Ki_oma (about 320 km), and from there to Dar o_ Salaam
aboard the East African Railroad (about 1,200 km). This long, in-
direct route (1,680 km), with two trans-shlpments, and Inevltably long
stage time (say, 20-25 days) would be similar in direct cost to the
Zaire traffic discussed above, but it would require a new road llnk
and improvement in infrastructure for the Lake traffic. Our previous
analysis in the case of Zalre would suggest that the H2 would roughly
be competitive with this mode even without capltal costs on the sur-
face route. The airship needs to fly only a little over 1,000 km to
reach the _ort of Mombasa (Kenya) where sheltered water areas are
available for loading to ships, compared to the 1,680 km Journey by ,
surface. The capital cost of surface transport infrastructure by this
route is comparatively modest--perhaps $45-50 million for the needed |
investment in roads, rolling stock, barges and tugs, and lake ports,
but this cost difference would appear to be decisive.
(b) A second alternative which has been discussed is to build a tall
llnk directly to Tabors for a continuous rall Journey from the mines,
to Tabors, hence to Dares Salaam aboard East African Railway. Costs
for the new link have been estimated as high as $300 million, since
the railroad would have to traverse very dlfflcult swampy areas. Once
in place, the railway would have reasonably low variable costs for the
entire trip length--about 1,200 km in a route nearly as direct as an
aiz route. The relative costs of this alternative compared to the
airship will depend, cruclally, on the anticipated traffic volume. At
relatively low volumes (such as 30,000 to 50,000 tons per year) the
capital co_: of the rail link would clearly be prohibitive, annual
interest on the railroad investment being about three times the total
annual cos_ of moving the traffic by airship.
(c) The third alternative would be to build a large enough airport at
the mining area to fly the metal _ Dares Salaam or Mom_asab aboard
efficient cargo planes. On an operating cost basis, the H2 could com-
pete almost equally wi=h a large je_ cargo plane, but the low traffic
' volumes would not employ even one medium sized cargo aircraft. The
infrastructure advantage of the H2, and the cheaper trsns-shlpment at
the port, would also seem to make the H2 preferable even at traffic
volumes large enough to employ a plane.
Clearly the Burundl nickel export is a special case. In _ome cases
(perh,-s in this one_ the additional development impact of a couven-
tlona_ mode would offset the airships advantages. But this and sil_-
ilar cases command attention for more detailed study.
Usin a Small Airships in the Pegio 9 East of the High Andes in Peru
In the use of airships in the Andean region, the development proKram
is considered in two basic ste_s: the use of a small airship, with
useful load capacity of about z tons; the use of a 15-ton capacity
dirigible to replace the small airship in a particular area once the
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technical aspects of the use of an airship in the area have been
proven, experience has been gained with its developmental impact and
- crews have received adequate training. Because the crew will generally
not have good ground support, they will need skill in maintenance and
unassisted landings, as well as for operating in difficult terrain.
' From the economic point of view, only the larger dirigible will be com-
petitive, as shown below. But to gain experience with maximum safety,
':: the smaller hlgh-powered, easily handled ship will be used. The cost
characteristics of both airships were presented in Table I. The
.. general zone that we are considering for use of these airships is east
of the Andes mountains in Peru. The region reaches from the mountain
* side called "ceja de montana" in Peru, to the Amazon valley. A zone
with similar geographic characteristics reaches into Ecuador and "
Colombia to the north and into Bolivia in the south. The altitude '
varies from 1,500 m in the mountains to 700 m in the east into un-
charted country, forests, and eventually into tropical Jungles through
: which run the head waters of the Amazon. The valleys are sparsely ,
_.-- populated, and the area is, for the most part, undeveloped. These
areas could potentially support a much larger population if better
transportation and communications .are supplied and if agriculture
/ production is improved. Peru is now a large importer of food, over
$230 million per year, in spite of having large unutilized areas for
agriculture.
._ In these regions, roads are costly to construct and hard to maintain,
,_ and may be impassable in many periods of the year. Vehicles deteri-
orate rapidly and have high maintenance requirements. The high freight
! rates reflect the condition and type of road, _he topography, and the
_, irregularity of loads, vehicle circulation, and backhaul=. Transport
'_ presents a particular problem in the flow of agricultural produc_
because the distribution of arable land is in relatively small valleys
separated by rough gorges and ravines. A valley can therefore remain
. quite isolated, economically, even though it is quite near a road.
The construction of access or penetration roads is extremely costly in
'_ the regions under consideration (above $250,000 per km). Although
distaDces are relatively short, the linking of all of the main valleys
w_ch penetration roads i_ therefore not Justified until and unless a
high level of development is reached.
Air transport with conventional aircraft would require a large number
of airstrips to provide adequate access and it is doubtful if they
could be constructed at a reasonable cost. Cost of transportation
' with alternative airborne modes have higher direc_ costs as well, for
example, the 5 to 1 De Havilland twin otter, $0.56 per ton kin, the
Helicopter Sikorskl, $1.49 per ton kin, as compared to the 15-ton air-
ship $0.30 per ton km. Consequently, the VTOL air transport mode is
envisioned to fulfill the communication needs._/
The transportation needs are for moving small cargos for short dis-
tances to road, tall or river heads. The aspects f_voring the dirig-
ible, in addition to its relatively reasorable cost of operation, are
its flexibility and very low infrastructure cost. It does not _equire
landing strips. An open field in size a little over twice the length
of the vehicle, with a simple mooring tower in its middle, around
which the airship can weather-vane, will suffice. Thus in such region
as described the airship could provide the llnk between the many iso-
lated small co_,_unities and the few roads which provide general access
to the region 4see map, page 13).
[
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The airship will be designed to operate out of a base located 700 m "s__b,_,
above sea level. Typical base points would be Atalaya at the con-
fluence of the Ucayall and Tumbo rivers in central Peru; Tarapoto or
Tingo Maria. Primitive airport facillties exist at these locations.
Transportation in the zone linked by the road Huanuco-Tlngo Maria-
Aguaytla - Presently the road is seml-completed. It is not paved and J30 _m remain as a flve-meter wide earth path. From Huanuco westward,
the road links up to the coast highway. We are considering the air- i
ships as alternatives to road development east of Huanuco.
The cost of completing the construction and the improvement of the !
219 km road from Huanuco to Aguaytla was estimated at $57,597,000,
$263,000 per km. Depreciation over twenty years with maintenance cost
_ of $650 per km per year results in a total yearly cost of $31,526 per ! ''
km for this road. Costs that have already been incurred to date, for
the original road, have not been included in this estimate. 1
In 1972, traffic over the 219 km road from Huanuco to Aguaytia varied _ '
from 350 vehicles per day between Huanuco and Tingo Maria to about
200-250 vehicles per day beyond Tingo Maria. At 300 vehicles per day
the annual cost of the road would be $0.282 per vehicle km or $.115 _
per ton km at the average load of 2.5 tons. The operating cost of the
medium trucks that ply this road has been estimated (in 1973) as $.25
per ton km.6/
-
TABLE I!I !
!
SUMMARY OF TRANSPORTATION COST HUANUCO-AGUAYTIA
I. Road 219 km
i. Capital Investment $000's $57,597
2. Annual Capital Charge plus maintenance per km $31,500
S 3. Annual Capital Charge per ton/kin S/ton-kin .I15
4. Total operating cost for truck $/ton-km .255
5. Total cost road transport $/ton-km .370
While the 2-ton alrshiv at $i o0 per ton km is not competitive on a
commercial basis, the 15-ton airship (at $0.296 per ton km) is highly
competitive. In addition, it has inherent advantages over roads. It
can stimulate agricultural development in a much broader zone, in
regions far from this principal road where the developing stage would
not Justify the constructions of costly feedez roads for new agrl-
cultural development programs. The investment in an airship is minor,
! and _ts use is flexible, making it less risky than high, fixed road
•: invc_tm_nt. The airship can aid the development of potentially rich i
; agricultural zones such as those considered, almost immedlately; it :
would be necessary to wait a long time before a road network is com- I
pleted, i
We conclude that in th_s case the airships are competitive with the
construction and periodic reconstruction of the main road servicing !
the area. In addition, the airship can connect regions that are not i
effectively serviced by the road. Compared to feeder roads, w_ich 1
would also have very high costs but much lower traffic volumes, the
airship is far less cos_ly.I •
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_'ansportation in an Isolate4 Region in the Peru Via Area - The Peru-
Via area (see circle on map, page 13) is almost due east of Lima. An
all weather road of about 180 km crosses the high Andes from Lima to
San Ramon which '.sJust on the western edge of this area.
Lack of transportation facilities represents the major obstacle to
agricultural developmen: in the Peru-Via area. Except for a few
: scattered landing strips for light planes, and small fringe areas
where dirt roads penetrate, the region is almost inoccessible. It has
been amply demonstrated through unsuccessful colonization experience
I east of the Andes, that transportation is indispensable to economic
development. Without adequate transportation there is economic stag-
nation, a lack of progre_ - and large-scale farm abandonment. Co'.on-
ization without proper tzdnsportation facilities would result in a
waste of national resources.
Several zones in this area are under active consideration in the
_'"-' country's development plans for the settlement of 37,000 families in ,
the Apurimac-Ene valleys and 20,000 in the Palcaza-Pichi region. The
• regions are apt for cattle, agricultural, and forest production. More
generally within the radius of 150 km from Atalaya lie regions with an
extremely rich potential. It can be expected that the presently
., existing population will multiply its output once a market for their
products is established, and new production technologies can be intro-
._ duced.
Atalaya is at a projected road distance of 365 km from the west-east
road head near San Ramon which provides con_nunication to the coast.
The projected road implies 316 km of mountain road (average con-
struction cost $/km 250,000) and 49 km of level road ($/km 150,000).
To provide adequate co_unication, several hundred kilometers of
feeder roads (estimated construction cost $/km 30,000) would also be
required.
2
_%e yearly capital charge for infrastructure of the principal linkage
only_ amortized over 20 years, is $27,700 per km. The annual main-
tenance cost. has been estimated at $650 per "km giving a total cost of
$28,350 per km.
With an average daily estimated traffic of I00 six-ton truck_ and a
return load factor of 30_, about 142,000 tons per year will be trans-
ported. Thus the cost for road usage would be average $.199 per ton
km. The truck operating cost per ton km on the new paved road is
estimated at $.32 based on the data provided by Sauti.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF TRANSPORTATION COSTS SAN RAMON-ATALAYA
I. Ro_ds 765 km
I. Capital Investment $000's $86,350
2. Annual Capital Charge plus maintenance $ per ton $28,350
3. Annual Capital and Maintenance Charge $ per ton km .30
4. Truck operation cost $/ton-km .32
5. Total cost per $1ton-km .52
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This cost is less than the direct transportation cost on a 2-ton
dirigible ($1ton-km 1.00), but conJiderably more than on a 15-ton
airship ($1ton-km 0.296) as estimated under present conditions.
t
The present situation is that the produce of this zone does not leave
the region due to lack of transport facility. The production remains
limited as ther_ are no accessible markets for trade. Thus we are
faced with questions such as:
(a) To develop or not to develop the zone.
(b) To start the transport projects practically immediately, or in
several years hence when the surface commmnication network can become
operational, e
(c) To risk heavy investment capital co develop surface transport
access at this time (before the developmer _ of the region is proven)
or to postpone the projects until such time when the production of the
zone is 51ourishing.
We would argue that in this case, where the road infrastructure is not
yet in place, and the economic risk of road infrastructure is very
large, that the investment in airships is far and away the most con-
servative approach _o linking this isolated area to the market.
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